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 The economics of long-term care: A 
survey 
Helmuth Cremer**, Pierre Pestieau*** and Gregory 
Ponthiere 
Summary 
This paper surveys recent theoretical economic research on long-term 
care (LTC). LTC differs from health care: it is about nursing; it is mostly 
provided by unpaid caregivers (mainly spouses and children), whereas 
both the market and the state play a modest role. The future of LTC ap-
pears to be gloomy: sustained population ageing and recent societal 
trends (e.g., children’s mobility, changes in family values) generate a 
mounting demand on the state and on the market to provide alternatives 
to the family. In this paper, we review these causes, and the extent to 
which we can expect them to fade away in the future. Then, we turn to the 
design of a sustainable public LTC scheme integrating both the market 
and the family. 
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Long-term care (LTC) concerns people who depend on help to carry 
out daily activities such as eating, bathing, dressing, going to bed, getting 
up or using the toilet. It is delivered informally by families – mainly 
spouses, daughters and step-daughters – and, to a lesser extent, formally 
by care assistants, who are paid under some form of employment con-
tract. Formal care is given at home or in an institution (such as care cen-
ters and nursing homes). The governments of most industrialized coun-
tries are involved in either the provision or financing of LTC services, or 
often both, although the extent and nature of their involvement differs 
widely across countries. 
In the future, the demand for formal LTC services by the population is 
likely to grow substantially. LTC needs start to rise exponentially from 
around the age of 80. The number of individuals aged 80 years and above 
is growing faster than any other segment of the population. As a conse-
quence, the number of dependent elderly at the European level (EU-27) is 
expected to grow from about 21 million people in 2007 to about 44 mil-
lion in 2060 (EC, 2009). Thus, we anticipate an increasing pressure on the 
resources demanded to provide LTC services for the frail elderly, and this 
pressure will be on the three institutions currently financing and provid-
ing LTC services: the state, the market and the family.1 
These three institutions have their pluses and minuses. The family 
provides services that are warm, cheap and distortionless. However, these 
services are restricted to each individual’s family circle. Furthermore, 
some families are very poor and some dependent persons cannot count on 
family solidarity at all.2 The state is the only institution that is universal 
and redistributive, but its information is quite often limited and its means 
of financing are distortionary. Finally, the market can be expensive, par-
ticularly where it is thin and without public intervention, it only provides 
services to those who can afford it.3 
                                                        
1 The existence of LTC provision outside markets leads to ambiguous predictions about the 
future growth of the formal LTC market. Indeed, as argued by Lakdawalla and Philipson (2002), 
aging may actually reduce the per capita demand for market LTC, provided that it raises the 
supply of non-market care produced by other elderly people. 
2 See Duée et al. (2005) on the predicted rise in the number of dependent elderly without family 
help in France. Note that large divorce rates may substantially increase the role of children in com-
parison to spouses for LTC provision. 
3 Regarding LTC provision in institutions, the quality of LTC services is strongly variable with 
the LTC techniques used (more or less labor intensive), which significantly affect the health of the 
elderly (see Cawley et al., 2004). 
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In assessing the adequacy of LTC financing and provision and in mak-
ing projections, it is important to bear in mind the extent to which coun-
tries will be able to rely on the informal provision of care in the future. 
The bulk of LTC is indeed provided informally.4 Informal provision has 
no direct bearing on public finances,5 but it is not clear that such a situa-
tion is desirable and, in any case, will last. Family solidarity is very une-
ven, and its propensity to provide care could diminish, due to changes in 
family structure and the growing participation of women in the labor 
market, which may constrain the future supply of informal care provision 
within households. 
The market for LTC insurance is still negligible, with the exceptions 
of France and the US. As to the public sector, few countries have a formal 
social LTC insurance. Even though they do not have a formal social in-
surance on LTC, most countries devote resources to the financing of LTC 
services, most often at the local level, but the share of GDP devoted to 
these is small. One may hope that both private and social LTC insurance 
will grow substantially in coming decades. But there is a number of prob-
lems that both the state and the market have to solve before they can re-
place family solidarity. 
In the next section, we first study the nature of dependency in old age. 
Then, we present some recent forecasts regarding future needs of LTC. In 
Section 2, we study what explains the underdevelopment of private insur-
ance for LTC; this is labeled as the LTC insurance market puzzle. Section 
3 is devoted to the role of family, more specifically, to different ways of 
modeling the interactions among parents, spouses and children. These 
interactions can be triggered by some sort of altruism or just by a mecha-
nism of intergenerational exchanges. Section 4 deals with the design of a 
sustainable public LTC scheme that integrates the role of the market and 
the family. A final section concludes the paper.6 
                                                        
4 According to Norton (2000), about two thirds of LTC is provided informally. Naturally, 
that figure is a simplification, since there exist strong international differences in LTC provision 
(see below). 
5 It clearly has indirect incidence by reducing female labor participation. 
6 For earlier surveys, see Norton (2000), Brown and Finkelstein (2009), Cremer et al. 
(2009) and Cremer and Pestieau (2010). 
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1. Concepts and facts 
Loss of autonomy or old-age dependency can be defined as the inability, 
due to old age, to carry out basic daily activities, such as, for instance, 
eating, dressing, washing, walking, etc. As a consequence of that inabil-
ity, dependent elderly people require LTC assistance. The LTC phenome-
non is thus permanent, non-accidental and due to old age and, as such, it 
should be distinguished from other phenomena, such as illness, disability 
and handicap. 
Measuring the loss of autonomy among the elderly is not straightfor-
ward, since it requires classifying the elderly as either autonomous or 
non-autonomous, whereas autonomy is a matter of degree. There exists a 
continuum of health states between the perfectly autonomous young adult 
and the fully dependent very old person. Several measures have been 
developed around the world to measure the prevalence of old-age de-
pendency. The well-known Katz scale, which is used by US insurers, 
counts as dependent the elderly who are unable to carry out at least two 
out of six activities of daily life (bathing, dressing, transferring, toilet use, 
eating and continence). Another scale is the AGGIR scale, which is used 
by the French national system for personal LTC allowances.7 
The prevalence of various autonomy restrictions at old age is well il-
lustrated by the concept of disability-free life expectancy, i.e. the average 
life duration without particular autonomy limitations.8 Figure 1 shows, in 
the case of France, the life expectancy at age 65 for men and women, as 
well as some disability-free life expectancy statistics, for 2003. Obvious-
ly, women live, on average, longer than men, and they also enjoy longer 
periods of life without disability. However, the periods with disabilities 
are also longer for women than for men. For instance, men spend, on 
average, 1.5 years with serious mobility restrictions, against 2.7 years for 
women.  
                                                        
7 On the variety of measures of autonomy loss, see Kessler (2007). 
8 That measure is directly computed on basis of probabilities of different limitations at each 
age of life. See Pérès et al. (2005) and Cambois et al. (2008). 
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Figure 1. Life expectancy without disability for men (left) and women (right) 
France, 2003 
  
Source: Cambois et al. (2008, p. 293). 
 
While those figures give us an idea of the prevalence of the LTC phe-
nomenon, they only concern an economy at a given point in time. One 
may also be interested in future LTC prevalence. Forecasting future needs 
is a daring but necessary undertaking. It requires two steps. First one 
wants to know the relative number of dependent elderly in the future. 
Second, one has to allocate those individuals among the various types of 
LTC: formal versus informal, private versus public. For the first step, we 
have good forecasts of the future population structure. According to the 
population projection by main age groups for EU27, the old-age depend-
ency ratio, calculated as the ratio of people aged 65+ relative to the work-
ing-age population, will go from 25.4 percent to 53.3 percent over the 
period 2008-2060.9 The dependency ratio of the oldest-old (people aged 
80+ over the working-age population) will increase from 6.5 percent to 
22 percent over the same period. Dependency does indeed increase with 
age, particularly after 75; it is more prevalent among women than among 
men, as shown in Figure 1. 
Regarding the proportion of dependent among the elderly, several 
forecasts can be made, depending on the predicted future evolution of 
dependency. As discussed by the EC (2009), two broad scenarios can be 
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used.10 On the one hand, the “pure demographic” scenario, according to 
which currently observed age-specific dependency rates will prevail in 
the future. In other words, there would be no improvement in the depend-
ency status of the elderly population even though average longevity in-
creases.11 On the other hand, the “constant disability” scenario, according 
to which the duration of the dependency period will remain unchanged in 
the future, despite the lengthening of life. These two scenarios are illus-
trated below. 
Forecasts under the “pure demographic” scenario are frightening: in 
EU27, the total number of dependent elderly will, under that scenario, 
grow from about 20 million in 2007 to 44 million in 2060, which corre-
sponds to a total growth of 115 percent.12 The number of dependent old 
individuals will more than double. 
Arguably, this “pure demographic” scenario is quite pessimistic, since 
it assumes that the average lifetime consumption of long-term care ser-
vices will increase over time. This “pure demographic” scenario also 
contradicts empirical studies predicting that the duration of the dependen-
cy period remains roughly constant in spite of an increase in the average 
duration of life; see, for instance, Cambois et al. (2008) who study disa-
bility in France above the age of 65. Therefore, one may prefer the “con-
stant disability” scenario, in which there is no extension of the morbidity 
period (in absolute terms) as the total length of life increases. But even 
under that more optimistic scenario, the number of dependents will still 
grow substantially in the next decades.13 
LTC is provided in different settings: formally and informally (some 
persons receive no care at all). In the case of formal care, it can be at 
home or in various types of institutions, including nursing homes and 
long-stay hospitals. Assuming the “pure demographic” scenario, that is, 
assuming that the probability (at any given age) of receiving formal care 
at home and formal care in an institution remains constant at the 2007 
level, the percentage change in the number of dependent receiving care in 
an institution would be 185 in EU27 (155 for EU10); for those receiving 
                                                        
10 In the projection of EC (2009), the dependency rates are drawn from SHARE – Survey on 
Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe. 
11 In other words, the rate of dependency of an 80-year old in the future is the same as that of 
an 80-year old today, but there will be more people living up to their 80th birthday in the future 
than today. 
12 Data source: EC (2009, p. 138). 
13 Data sources: EC (2009, p. 140). 
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formal care at home, the percentage change would be 151 (171 for 
EU10). Finally, the percentage change for those only relying on informal 
care would be 84 in EU27 (119 in EU10). However, those aggregate 
trends actually hide strong international heterogeneity, as shown on Fig-
ure 2. Whereas the dependent population in France is more or less equally 
distributed across the three types of LTC, this is not true in many coun-
tries. For instance, overall formal care (institutions or home) is nowadays 
largely underdeveloped in Italy and Poland. 
Figure 2. Formal and informal LTC, 2007-2060 
   
Source: EC (2009, p. 138). 
 
We can now turn to the projected public expenditure on LTC present-
ed by the EC 2009 Ageing Report (EC 2009). Assuming the “pure demo-
graphic” scenario, LTC public expenditure is projected to on average 
increase by 115 percent for EU27. The projected increase ranges from 65 
percent in France and the UK to 175 percent and above in the Czech Re-
public, Spain, Malta, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.  
Extrapolating on the basis of existing policies and expenditures does 
not capture the full scale of the policy challenge. Future changes in the 
number of people receiving informal or no care, and whether they will 
receive the care services they need, are also crucial policy questions. 
Countries with low levels of formal care provision today (and thus low 
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increase in the projected number of individuals in need of care. Pressure 
is likely to emerge in the future for policy changes to increase formal care 
provision, especially as the future availability of informal care is likely to 
diminish rather than increase. The gap between the need for care and the 
supply of formal care will widen due to the growing numbers of elderly 
people and a likely reduction in the supply of informal care within house-
holds.14  
2. The LTC insurance market puzzle 
For a large majority of individuals, the cost of LTC in case of severe 
dependence is high, if not prohibitive. To illustrate this, let us focus on 
the example of France. Whereas the average pension of a French house-
hold is about EUR 1 200 a month, the cost of a good nursing home runs 
much above that figure. The average cost of institutional long-term care 
for old people in France is currently at EUR 35 000 per dependent per 
year (see OECD, 2006), whereas the yearly price of a nursing home in the 
US ranges between USD 40 000 and USD 75 000 (see Taleyson, 2003). 
But despite those large costs, and despite the significant probabilities 
of becoming dependent in old age (Kemper and Murtaugh, 1991), the 
LTC private insurance market remains small. This underdevelopment of 
the LTC private insurance market goes against simple theoretical predic-
tions and, as such, constitutes what is now commonly called the LTC 
insurance puzzle. In this section, we survey some major factors explain-
ing that puzzle.15 We shall distinguish between, on the one hand, factors 
based on perfect rationality and, on the other hand, factors presupposing 
behavioral imperfections.  
2.1 Excessive costs 
Maybe the simplest explanation of the LTC insurance puzzle lies in its 
high price which, following standard microeconomics textbooks, leads to 
a low demand. Various empirical studies show that, for most individuals, 
                                                        
14 Although the scale of this effect will depend on the starting employment rates of women, 
among other factors. 
15 Other recent surveys on that issue include Brown and Finkelstein (2011) and Pestieau and 
Ponthiere (2011). 
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a private LTC insurance is something very expensive, which they cannot 
afford. According to Rivlin et al. (1988), only 20 percent of US citizens 
could purchase insurance for less than 5 percent of their income. Those 
figures are confirmed by those in the Lifespans Surveys (1992): 91 per-
cent of those who do not purchase a private LTC private insurance find 
that this is far too expensive (see Cutler, 1993). Hence, in the light of this, 
it appears that explaining the LTC insurance puzzle a priori looks quite 
simple: the high price suffices to explain everything. 
The price of a private LTC insurance has been studied in detail by 
Brown and Finkelstein (2007). Those authors estimate, on the basis of 
HRS (Health and Retirement Survey) data, that a private LTC insurance 
purchased at age 65 has a load factor equal to 0.18.16 This means that, for 
any dollar spent on LTC costs, one can hope to get 0.82 dollars back. 
That load factor of 0.18 is much larger than for standard health care in-
surance, where the load factor lies between 0.06 and 0.10 (see Newhouse, 
2002). At a first glance, it is tempting to conclude, from those figures, 
that the low covering rate of the private LTC insurance does no longer 
look like a puzzle. 
However, things are not so simple. Brown and Finkelstein (2007) also 
provide estimates of the load factor by gender, and find significant differ-
ences across gender: men face a load factor of 0.44, whereas women ben-
efit from a load factor equal to -0.04 (that is, better than actuarially fair 
prices).17 
Quite surprisingly, the participation rate is almost equal for men and 
women, despite that large differential in load factors. That result either 
suggests that there is a strong correlation, within households, about insur-
ance decisions, or, alternatively, that prices, although high, may not ex-
plain the entire picture of the LTC insurance puzzle. 
What can explain those high load factors? According to Brown and 
Finkelstein (2007), it is hard to discriminate, on the basis of empirical 
observations, between four causes: administrative costs, imperfect com-
petition, asymmetric information and aggregate risk of rising costs. All 
those causes imply a high loading factor, as well as limits in the benefits 
                                                        
16 The load factor is defined as the ratio: one minus the expected discounted present value of 
monetary benefits divided by the expected discounted present value of insurance premia. 
17 This large men/women differential may reflect gender differences in the LTC utilization, 
due to women’s higher longevity but, also, that elderly men are more likely to receive informal 
aid from their spouses, as compared to elderly women. 
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comprehensiveness (i.e. quantity rationing), which are also observed (i.e. 
the typically purchased policy covers only 1/3 of the expected LTC ex-
penditures). 
But beyond the actual level of the LTC insurance price, the presence 
of asymmetric information may make the LTC insurance price even more 
excessive. Despite recent medical advances, it remains very difficult for 
an insurer to forecast, for a given individual, the evolution of his autono-
my and health status across the lifecycle. In other words, the probability 
of old age dependency remains very hard to extract for the insurer. At the 
end of the day, the best informed individual remains the future elderly 
himself. But if the elderly is more informed than the insurer, the standard 
adverse selection problem arises: only individuals with a sufficiently 
large probability of old-age dependency will purchase LTC private insur-
ance. Note that this better information about future autonomy prospects 
may lead individuals to postpone, as much as possible, the purchase of 
LTC insurance, as suggested by Meier (1999).18 
The existence of asymmetric information on the LTC insurance mar-
ket is studied by Finkelstein and McGarry (2006). Using AHEAD data 
(US), they show that there exists no positive correlation between, on the 
one hand, the fact of having purchased a private LTC insurance and, on 
the other hand, the probability of institutionalization (nursing home). In 
other words, the ratio of LTC insured persons to the whole population 
among individuals admitted to nursing homes does not significantly differ 
from unity. However, this absence of correlation does not imply that no 
asymmetric information exists. Finkelstein and McGarry show that the 
subjective probability of institutionalization within 5 years (which is not 
observable) is positively correlated with the fact of being insured against 
LTC. Hence, there exists some asymmetric information, and the absence 
of correlation between insurance and institutionalization comes from 
another selection mechanism, preferences-based selection, which coun-
terbalances the standard risk-selection mechanism. According to Finkel-
stein and McGarry, precautionary behavior, as measured by the past pur-
chase of other insurance, is positively correlated with the purchase of 
LTC insurance, but negatively correlated with institutionalization. This 
                                                        
18 This alternative explanation of the LTC insurance puzzle is even more likely once it is 
acknowledged that LTC insurance is associated with large yearly administrative costs (see 
below). Those costs discourage an early purchase of LTC insurance, and favor postponement. 
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double selection mechanism explains the contraction of the LTC private 
insurance market despite the absence of correlation between the purchase 
of insurance and the institutionalization. 
The existence of an adverse selection problem on the LTC insurance 
market is confirmed by Sloan and Norton (1997). On the basis of two 
surveys for the US (AHEAD – Asset and Health Dynamics – and HRS – 
Health and Retirement Survey), Sloan and Norton find a positive and 
statistically significant correlation between the subjective probability of 
entering a nursing home and the probability of purchasing LTC insur-
ance.19 More recently, Courbage and Roudaut (2008) find, on the basis of 
SHARE data for France (Survey on Health, Aging and Retirement in Eu-
rope), that there exists a positive and statistically significant correlation 
between, on the one hand, having a high risk of dependency (e.g. high 
BMI scores and high alcohol consumption) and, on the other hand, the 
purchase of LTC insurance. Hence, the plausible presence of adverse 
selection may contribute to explain the high LTC insurance costs and, as 
a consequence, the LTC insurance puzzle. 
Note also that, besides that standard, static adverse election, some 
studies also highlighted the possible existence of a dynamic adverse se-
lection, which would also explain the underdevelopment of the LTC pri-
vate insurance market. The underlying idea, studied in Finkelstein et al. 
(2005), is the following. Even in the absence of asymmetric information, 
there may be an inefficiency of the LTC insurance market in a dynamic 
environment where agents are strongly encouraged to break their insur-
ance contract. According to the HRS database, the probability of institu-
tionalization is lower among those who break their insurance contract. 
Note that such a lower probability of institutionalization could, at first 
glance, be due to standard moral hazard (those keeping the insurance 
would spend more on LTC).20 However, Finkelstein et al. (2005) reject 
that hypothesis, on the grounds that, among those leaving the LTC insur-
ance market, the probability of institutionalization is not influenced by the 
fact of shifting to another insurance, or giving up all insurance. Note, 
however, that, in the light of the characteristics of those breaking their 
                                                        
19 Naturally, one cannot exclude the existence of moral hazard explaining that correlation. 
However, Sloan and Norton (1997) find that family structure variables (marital status and chil-
dren), which should here affect the occurrence of moral hazard, do not influence the probability 
of purchasing LTC insurance. 
20 On moral hazard in nursing home uses, see Grabowski and Gruber (2007). 
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insurance contract, explanations alternative to the revelation of new piec-
es of information may rationalize the break: either initial mistakes by 
LTC insurance purchasers or, possibly, (uninsured) negative income 
shocks. 
2.2 Unattractive rule of reimbursement (lump sum) 
Another explanation for the LTC insurance puzzle consists of the specific 
form of the LTC insurance contracts currently existing on the market. 
One would expect, like in standard health care insurance, LTC insurance 
contracts giving a right to the reimbursement of care and service costs, 
possibly up to a certain limit and with multiple options, including deduct-
ibles. The problem is that an increasing number of insurance markets, 
typically the French one, provide for the payment of a monthly lump-sum 
cash benefit, which is proportionate to the degree of dependency involved 
and adjusted according to the evolution of this dependency. These prod-
ucts are closely related to annuitized products and the limited insurance 
they provide is justified by some type of ex post moral hazard.21 
The degree of dependency can be assessed quite objectively. Howev-
er, the extent of the needs of a dependent person is much more difficult to 
assess objectively. The needs of a dependent person are less easy to as-
sess than in the case of well-known disabilities. The perception of LTC is 
a very recent phenomenon, and the needs implied by a loss of autonomy 
are vague and susceptible to various interpretations, depending on family 
background and the social environment. For example, washing difficul-
ties may give rise to a demand for various kinds of services, depending on 
the person concerned. This diversity of potential needs and demands may 
give rise to a large number of costly discussions. Hence, to avoid these 
discussions, insurance firms prefer to offer a cash benefit that dependent 
people can use in their own way, with the consequence that some individ-
uals feel shorthanded. 
Although the precise form of LTC insurance contract may seem irrel-
evant for the explanation of the LTC insurance puzzle, the associated 
incompleteness of the LTC insurance contract has often be proposed as a 
major cause of the underdevelopment of private LTC insurance markets. 
                                                        
21 This type of moral hazard cannot allegedly be taken care of by the traditional co-payments 
or deductibles. 
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In a pioneer paper, Cutler (1993) argued that, since there exists a long 
delay between, on the one hand, the purchase of the LTC insurance and, 
on the other hand, the first LTC-related costs, there may exist a strong 
intertemporal variability of LTC costs per dependent person. The risk of a 
rise in LTC costs per dependent person is common to all members of a 
cohort and thus, cannot be diversified on a cohort (contrary to the risk of 
loss of autonomy, which can be diversified on a single cohort). Therefore, 
the only way for insurers of protecting themselves against too large reim-
bursements to elderly dependent due to a rise in LTC costs is to carry out 
intertemporal pooling on several cohorts. But such an intertemporal pool-
ing can only work when LTC costs are not intertemporally correlated. 
Unfortunately, LTC costs are also strongly correlated over time, which 
makes intertemporal pooling difficult. As a consequence, the risk of a rise 
in LTC costs per dependent cannot be fully insured. This explains why 
LTC insurance contracts now propose lump-sum reimbursement, or nu-
merous limitations to reimbursement (e.g. thresholds). Moreover, Cutler 
(1993) also emphasizes the strongly risky nature of LTC insurance. This 
highly risky nature has an immediate corollary for investors: large risk 
premiums are required, to compensate for the risk taken by the insurers. 
Those high risk premiums lead to excessive LTC insurance prices (see 
below). 
In sum, the inadequacy of lump-sum reimbursement deters individuals 
from purchasing a private LTC insurance.22 That explanation differs from 
the previous one, which presupposed a complete LTC insurance, but 
questioned the high level of the insurance price. On the contrary, the core 
of that alternative explanation of the LTC insurance puzzle lies in the 
necessarily incomplete nature of the LTC insurance contract. Rational 
forward-looking individuals may not want to purchase such an incom-
plete insurance.23 
                                                        
22 However, some studies, such as Taleyson (2003) and Kessler (2007), argued, contrary to 
Cutler (1993), that lump-sum reimbursement is a major factor explaining the dynamism of the 
French LTC insurance market as compared to the US market. 
23 The formal properties of the fixed reimbursement insurance are studied in detail in Eeck-
houdt et al. (2003). See also Cremer, Lozachmeur and Pestieau (2012) 
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2.3 Crowding out by the family 
Another explanation of the LTC insurance puzzle consists of crowding 
out of private LTC insurance by family solidarity.24 The underlying ra-
tionale goes as follows. True, if economic agents were living alone, with-
out any family or friends, there would exist few effective ways of insur-
ing oneself against the substantial  and highly likely  LTC spending at 
old age. Therefore, in such a narrow context, forward-looking rational 
agents would definitely buy private LTC insurance. However, the real 
world is quite different, and many individuals can, once dependent, rely 
on their spouse or on their children to be helped in case of LTC. There-
fore, the low level of private LTC insurance coverage does not result 
from irrationality. On the contrary, private LTC insurance is regarded as 
non-optimal by rational individuals who anticipate future help from their 
family. 
Another family-based explanation of the LTC insurance puzzle was 
proposed by Pauly (1990). Parents actually prefer not to be sent to an 
institution once they are dependent. Clearly, parents have a strong prefer-
ence for receiving help from their own children or grandchildren. That 
preference for family-provided LTC tends, under weak assumptions, to 
rule out LTC private insurance. Indeed, such insurance tends to reduce 
the cost of institutionalization and, hence, increases the probability of 
being sent to a nursing home. Therefore, provided that, in case of old-age 
dependency, a rational person prefers to be helped by a family member 
rather than by an unknown social worker, the incentive to purchase a 
private LTC insurance is low, even in the absence of state assistance. 
It should be stressed, however, that the existence of family concerns 
does not, on its own, suffice to explain the LTC insurance puzzle. The 
reason is that the precise form of parental preferences matters. If a parent 
is sufficiently altruistic towards his children, then, as argued by Pauly 
(1996), he will buy LTC private insurance in order to avoid burdening his 
spouse or children in case of old-age dependency.25 He will do so despite 
the fact that, from a purely egoistic perspective, he would have preferred 
being helped by his children or spouse rather than being sent to an anon-
                                                        
24 That explanation is quite close to the one used in another well-known puzzle: the annuity 
puzzle (see Brown, 2007). In that context, the family would provide an insurance against an 
unexpected long life. 
25 This burden could be in terms of money (LTC spending) or time (in case of home-based 
informal help). 
 The economics of long-term care: A survey 121 
ymous institution. However, if a parent is not sufficiently altruistic, he 
will behave strategically and use the promise of high bequests to be 
helped by his family (see Norton, 2000).26 Therefore, the mere existence 
of family concerns only explains the LTC insurance puzzle under particu-
lar preferences for parents. 
This family-based explanation of the LTC insurance puzzle has been 
subject to various empirical tests, with quite equivocal results. On the 
basis of US data, Sloan and Norton (1997) show that the bequests left to 
descendants do not have any statistically significant effect on the demand 
for private LTC insurance. That empirical finding does not support the 
family-based explanation. However, a more recent study by Courbage 
and Roudaut (2008) shows, on the basis of the French SHARE data, that 
being married and having children makes it more likely to purchase pri-
vate LTC insurance. This latter empirical result supports the importance 
of parental preferences for the issue at stake (Pauly, 1996), but without 
fully validating the family-based explanation of the LTC insurance puz-
zle. Indeed, if parental altruism makes parents buy LTC private insurance, 
then the underdevelopment of LTC insurance would reveal the wide-
spread lack of altruism among parents, which does not seem fully con-
vincing. 
2.4 Crowding out by the state 
Besides the reliance on the family, another possible explanation for the 
LTC insurance puzzle points to a potential crowding out by state assis-
tance (Norton, 2000). The underlying idea is the following. By acting as 
the Good Samaritan, the government can supply some aid to the depend-
ent elderly without resources. Therefore, rational forward-looking indi-
viduals have little incentive to buy LTC private insurance, simply because 
they can benefit from state-provided resources at old age without having 
purchased any private insurance. Hence, provided that the state can help 
the elderly dependent in need, buying a private LTC insurance is a waste 
of resources. 
Note that this kind of crowding out argument does not require the ac-
tual existence of a large public LTC program. Indeed, only the expecta-
                                                        
26 We assume that children cannot buy an insurance to protect themselves against LTC 
spending on their parents. 
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tion of state-provided help to the elderly dependent in need suffices to do 
the job. Hence, given the distance to old-age dependency, it is easy for 
individuals to believe that, by the time they become dependent, the state 
will have developed a new “pillar” of the social security system.27 
The hypothesis of crowding out by the state has been largely debated 
in the US, where social assistance  i.e. Medicaid  is often suspected to 
be at the origin of the LTC insurance puzzle. Sloan and Norton (1997) 
show that there exists a statistically significant negative correlation be-
tween, on the one hand, the probability of purchasing a private LTC in-
surance and, on the other hand, the variables determining the eligibility 
for Medicaid. More recently, Brown and Finkelstein (2008) estimate a 
lifecycle utility model for an individual of age 65 (men and women) 
choosing a lifecycle consumption profile under risk for LTC expendi-
tures. They compute the willingness to pay for LTC private insurance 
under various degrees of risk-aversion and show that, for a wide range of 
preferences, the utility gain from buying LTC insurance is negative. They 
also argue that Medicaid, by its role of last resort payer, would explain at 
least 2/3 of the contraction of the US private insurance market, even when 
actuarially fair LTC insurance would be available. The hypothesis of 
crowding out by Medicaid has also been tested by Brown et al. (2007). 
On the basis of HRS data, they estimate that a USD 10 000 fall of the 
Medicaid eligibility threshold would increase the LTC insurance cover-
age ratio by 1.1 points.28 
In the light of those results, the crowding out of private LTC insurance 
by Medicaid in the US seems to be statistically significant. However, the 
exact size of the crowding out phenomenon remains hard to quantify. 
This leaves us with two possibilities. Either the crowding out by the state 
assistance only explains a part of the LTC insurance puzzle; i.e. other 
factors are also at work. Alternatively, it may be that, rather than the ac-
tual assistance by the state, the crowding out may follow from expecta-
tions about future state assistance. 
To conclude, it should be stressed that the crowding out by state assis-
tance, if it exists, can take various forms, which have different implica-
                                                        
27 See Section 4 on the difficulties raised by the construction of that pillar. 
28 According to Brown et al. (2007), the minor effect of eligibility criteria can be explained 
as follows. Provided that Medicaid remains a secondary payer, it follows that even without any 
asset limits to Medicaid eligibility, a large portion of the private insurance benefits are redundant 
to what Medicaid would otherwise have paid. 
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tions. First, some individuals may decide to spend all their wealth when 
being healthy, in order to become eligible for state assistance. Second, 
one may simply hide one’s resources in such a way as to become eligible 
for social assistance. Third, some individuals may, in contrast, transfer 
their wealth to their children through inter vivos gifts, in order, here 
again, to become eligible for social assistance. Those three cases are 
characterized by different individual lifecycle consumption profiles, for 
individuals and their siblings. But, from the point of view of the state, the 
outcome is the same: such a strategic behavior makes those individuals 
eligible for assistance, through means-tested benefits such as Medicaid in 
the US or the APA in France. Given that the public authorities are often 
reluctant to reclaim part of the estate of those having benefited from LTC 
assistance, such strategic behaviors will be adopted and lead to the effec-
tive crowding out of private LTC insurance by the state. 
2.5 State dependent utility 
So far, we have implicitly assumed that the form of the utility function is 
the same in all states of the world. LTC prevalence is an instance when 
this assumption might be violated. The preferences are totally different 
for someone who is healthy and has a variety of goals in life, and for 
someone who is disabled, and has well-defined but limited needs. In 
standard utility maximization problems, the first-order conditions that 
characterize the optimum equate the marginal utility of consumption 
across states. If the utility function is the same in all states, an individual 
equates the marginal utility of consumption by equating the level of con-
sumption across states. Insurance provides a simple mechanism for 
smoothing consumption across states of the world. Assume that to reach a 
certain level of welfare, one needs much more resources in a state of dis-
ability than in a state of full autonomy and that in case of disability, one 
quickly reaches some type of satiation (there is a limit to the level of 
nursing one’s needs). In that case, the demand for insurance can be nil or, 
at best, low. 
Let us denote the utility in the state of autonomy as u(c) and the utility 
in the state of dependence as H(m), where c and m represent the corre-
sponding level of consumption. The probability of dependence is π and θ 
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is the premium for an actuarially fair insurance. The expected utility can 
be written as 
 
    1EU u w H w            (1) 
 
where w is the initial wealth. Clearly, it pays to buy some insurance if -
    0u w H w   . In other words, if the marginal utility of wealth is 
higher in disability than in autonomy. This in turn may depend on the 
wealth level. When H reaches a saturation level,  u w  may be larger 
than  H w  when the individual is sufficiently wealthy. In other words, 
once nursing is financed, the wealthy disabled has no more need. 
Finkelstein et al. (2008) note that it is a priori ambiguous whether the 
marginal utility of consumption rises or falls with deteriorating health, 
given that some goods (e.g. travel) are complements to good health while 
other goods (e.g. assistance with self-care) are substitutes for good health. 
However, they also provide evidence, using subjective well-being 
measures from HRS, that a one standard-deviation increase in an individ-
ual’s number of chronic diseases is associated with an 11 percent decline 
in marginal utility. They report that this reduces the optimal share of med-
ical expenditures covered by health insurance by about 20 to 45 percent-
age points. In a theoretical paper, Bien et al. (2012) derive the conditions 
under which rational forward-looking agents do not buy LTC private 
insurance; these conditions pertain to the substitutability between three 
dimensions of welfare: consumption, autonomy and health. 
2.6 Myopia or ignorance 
So far, we have only considered explanations of the LTC insurance puz-
zle, which suppose rational forward-looking agents. Put differently, when 
deciding not to purchase private LTC insurance, individuals do not make 
any mistake or judgment error. According to those explanations, it is 
rational, in the presence of a high LTC insurance loading factor, not to 
buy an insurance that only provides quite limited reimbursement under 
the form of lump-sum payments. The presence of family and state assis-
tance reinforces the incentive not to purchase private insurance. Finally, if 
state-dependent utility is such that, under old-age dependency, the mar-
ginal utility of income is very low, there is also no rational argument for 
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purchasing private LTC insurance. Hence, under those explanations, 
agents behave rationally and, as a consequence, the low level of LTC 
private insurance markets is also individually rational. 
Whereas those explanations are plausible, these are not the unique 
possible ones. It is also possible to rationalize the observed low covering 
of LTC insurance, while regarding the non-purchasing decisions as irra-
tional. This kind of explanation can take various forms, but each of these 
involves some kind of behavioral imperfection.  
A first behavioral explanation consists of an underestimation, among 
the population, of the risk of old-age dependency. There is a well-known 
downward bias of the probability of occurrence of negative events in life. 
Old-age dependency obviously being negatively loaded, individuals are 
likely to minimize its frequency of occurrence. Note, however, that such a 
downward bias is not benign at all as far as the demand for LTC private 
insurance is concerned. Under a low probability of old-age dependency, 
the individual’s incentive to purchase insurance is pretty low since the 
expected welfare gains from such an insurance are not only temporally 
distant, but, also, highly unlikely, whereas the cost of such an insurance is 
certain (and high, as shown above). Thus, some underestimation of the 
risk of old-age dependency may explain a significant part of the LTC 
insurance puzzle. 
The objective probabilities of old-age dependency estimated in the lit-
erature are quite high. For instance, according to Murtaugh et al. (1997), 
an individual aged 65 has a 0.43 probability of entering a nursing home. 
That probability is also shown to differ significantly across gender: it is 
equal to 0.33 for men (as their wife will generally be in better health and 
thus will take care of them), and to about 0.50 for women. Moreover, 
Murtaugh et al. (1997) show that the stays at nursing homes are long: 15-
20 percent of the newcomers will remain more than five years. Taken 
together, those estimates should, in principle, make a large proportion of 
the population at risk buy LTC private insurance. Naturally, that claim 
presupposes that individuals are well-informed and can easily manipulate 
probabilities. 
On the basis of the high objective probabilities of old-age dependency, 
one can interpret the low demand for LTC insurance as revealing the 
downward bias in the subjective probabilities of old-age dependency. 
Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) show, on the basis of AHEAD data (av-
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erage age: 79 years), that the distribution of the subjective probability of 
entering a nursing home within the next five years of life has a singular 
form, and is not single-peaked. About 50 percent of the population con-
sider that the probability that they will enter a nursing home in the next 
five years is zero. The second peak of the distribution arises at the value 
of 0.50: about 15 percent of the population believe that the probability of 
entering a nursing home equals 0.50. Very few people assign a probabil-
ity larger than 0.50. Undoubtedly, that singular distribution of the subjec-
tive probability of old-age dependency supports the underestimation the-
sis: the low demand for LTC insurance would thus reveal individuals’ – 
excessive – optimism about future health status. 
It should be stressed, however, that subjective probabilities may not 
explain the LTC insurance puzzle as a whole. To see this, note that, ac-
cording to Finkelstein and McGarry (2006), eight percent of the individu-
als who believe that they will definitely not enter a nursing home within 5 
years have actually purchased LTC insurance. Given the high age of the 
surveyed individuals, this figure is somewhat surprising, and suggests that 
individuals may have difficulties in manipulating small numbers, and in 
drawing all conclusions from their subjective beliefs. 
More importantly, biases in the assessment of old-age dependency risk 
may tend to vanish over time, as individuals can, over their lifecycle, 
learn about their health capital, for instance by observing the health of 
their own, elderly parents. Such a learning process may tend to qualify 
the underestimation hypothesis, by suggesting that this cause of the LTC 
insurance puzzle would only be valid in a very short time horizon. Re-
garding this learning effect, Courbage and Roudaut (2008) report, on the 
basis of French data in SHARE, that the probability of purchasing a pri-
vate LTC insurance is increasing with the fact of having received an in-
formal help, and is also increasing in the fact of having provided such a 
help. Those empirical findings cast some light on the formation of subjec-
tive beliefs about old-age dependency risk. 
In sum, the existing literature – the observed gap between objective 
and subjective probabilities of old-age dependency – suggests that there 
may be a strong behavioral explanation to the LTC insurance puzzle. 
Nonetheless, the precise form of the behavioral imperfection is harder to 
identify. Low subjective probabilities of old-age dependency may reflect 
myopia, or ignorance, or optimism, or some other bizarre attitude to risk. 
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Having stressed this, one can hardly, in the light of the existing empirical 
literature, keep the standard objective expected utility models with full 
information as good approximations for the description of real choices in 
terms of LTC insurance. 
2.7 Denial of heavy dependence 
Finally, besides the subjective versus objective probability issue, another 
behavioral explanation can be explored here. Clearly, when discussing 
LTC so far, we did as if old-age dependency is regarded as a standard, 
everyday life issue by individual decision-makers. In that context, pur-
chasing a private LTC insurance would be formally close to purchasing 
common goods (like cars etc.). This constitutes an obvious simplification. 
Old-age dependency is the exact opposite of an everyday life issue. Old-
age dependency is a unique event in one’s life (i.e. something comparable 
to childhood). Given the singularity of old-age dependency, one can hard-
ly treat the purchase of a private insurance against LTC costs as the pur-
chase of a normal insurance (e.g. against car accidents or domestic fires). 
Heavy dependence, like death, is a source of anxiety and, as such, this 
may imply the possibility of denial of dependence-relevant information, 
interacting with intertemporal choices. One would try to forget about old-
age dependency in the same way as one tries to forget about death. Such a 
denial of old-age dependency is likely to lead to time-inconsistent deci-
sions and other “behavioral” phenomena.29 
The repression of signals of mortality leads to underinsurance for un-
sophisticated individuals. Note that for forward-sophisticated individuals, 
the result can be reversed: they may over-insure in anticipation of future 
denial and seek commitment devices. The refusal to face up to the reality 
of dependence may help explain an inadequate purchase of LTC insur-
ance. Private LTC insurance only makes sense provided that one 
acknowledges the mere existence of old-age dependency. Denying that 
possible event in life makes the purchase of LTC insurance so irrelevant 
that it will not even enter the set of possible consumption bundles. 
Although that denial explanation of the LTC insurance puzzle shares 
some psychological, behavioral features with myopia or ignorance (see 
above), one should be careful to avoid mixing those two types of explana-
                                                        
29 On the denial of death and its behavioral consequences, see Kopczuk and Slemrod (2005). 
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tions. Clearly, while one may think about (more or less) easy ways of 
correcting for myopia or ignorance (e.g. information campaigns, adequate 
taxes or subsidies), the same is not that obvious in case of denial of old-
age dependency. The reason is that a denial is not due to the failure to 
perceive things, or to collect or process the required information. On the 
contrary, a denial consists of a lack of will to do so. This kind of behav-
ioral imperfection seems harder to overcome by means of standard policy 
instruments.  
3. The role of family solidarity 
As already mentioned, most seniors with impairments reside in their 
home or that of their relatives, and they largely rely on volunteer care 
from the family. These include seniors with severe impairments (unable 
to perform at least four activities of daily living). And many people who 
pay for care in their home also rely on some donated services. The eco-
nomic value of volunteer care is significant, although the estimates of it 
are highly uncertain. 
Whether this solidarity is sustainable at its current level is an im-
portant question. There are numerous sources of concern. The drastic 
change in family values, the increasing number of childless households, 
the mobility of children, the increasing labor participation of women are 
as many factors explaining why the number of dependent elderly who 
cannot count on family solidarity is increasing.30 
An important feature that is often neglected is the real motivation for 
family solidarity. For long, we have adopted the fairytale view of children 
or spouses helping their dependent parents with joy and dedication, what 
we call pure altruism. We now increasingly realize that family solidarity 
is often based on forced altruism (social norm) or strategic considerations 
(reciprocal altruism). In this section, we review some recent work on 
these issues. 
Knowing the foundation of altruism is very important in order to see 
how family assistance will react to the emergence of a private or public 
scheme of LTC insurance. For example, the introduction of LTC social 
                                                        
30 See Duée et al. (2005) on the factors explaining the rise in the number of elderly depend-
ent individuals in need who cannot benefit from someone’s informal help. 
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insurance is expected to crowd out family solidarity based on pure altru-
ism, but not necessarily that based on forced altruism. In families where 
solidarity is based on strategic exchanges (bequest or inter vivos gifts in 
exchange for assistance), the incidence of a social LTC scheme will be a 
decline in intergenerational transfers. The issue of crowding out is perva-
sive as it does not only concern the possible substitutability between 
family solidarity and formal schemes, but also between social and private 
LTC, as we will see below. We now survey a sample of recent microeco-
nomic papers dealing with LTC and family relations. 
3.1 Strategic bequest motive 
The classic paper on strategic bequests by Bernheim et al. (1985) shows 
that parents can, in theory, extract from their children the maximum 
amount of attention and/or assistance, by playing them against each other 
with the prospect of inheritance. In this type of model, parents have a 
hold on the game. That strategic bequest motive is shown, in that same 
paper, to be empirically supported by the existence of a positive correla-
tion between the attention paid to parents (the number of visits and phone 
calls) and the (potential) wealth inherited by children. 
Note, however, that the strategic bequest motive presupposes that the 
dependent elderly has sufficiently good cognitive skills. The reason is that 
the elderly dependent can only take part in exchanges with his children 
provided that he remains the effective decision-maker regarding the allo-
cation of his resources. Thus, under the strategic bequest motive, chil-
dren’s care is conditional on parental cognitive awareness, unlike under 
pure family altruism.31 
This observation has been used in subsequent empirical studies in or-
der to test the existence of a strategic bequest motive. Hoerger et al. 
(1996) show, on the basis of National Long Term Care Survey (NLTCS) 
data, that the level of parental cognitive awareness has no impact at all on 
the attention and care received from children. It even appears that, among 
cognitively able parents, the received informal help is smaller among 
                                                        
31 For cognitive skills along the lifecycle, see recent studies by Adam et al. (2007) and 
Agarwal et al. (2007). The cognitive performance decreases beyond the age of 60, with slopes 
varying with the socio-professional group. 
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richer parents. This contradicts the existence of a strategic bequest mo-
tive.32 
Sloan et al. (1997) consider an alternative family model where the el-
derly parent derives some welfare from the child’s informal aid. The child 
is not purely altruistic, but he would like his parent to be helped. The 
levels of informal and formal care are then treated as the outcome of an 
intrafamily bargaining process. Informal aid is, in theory, increasing with 
the number of children (as this makes the threat of no bequest more plau-
sible), increasing in the degree of parental cognitive awareness (see 
above), and in the parent’s wealth (since this makes the child follow his 
parent’s will better). Empirical tests using NLTCS data lead to the rejec-
tion of all those theoretical predictions. Thus, there is little empirical 
support for the hypothesis that care giving by children is motivated by the 
prospect of receiving bequests from their parents. Moreover, Sloan et al. 
(1997) show that Medicaid subsidies have not “crowded out” informal 
care provided by relatives and friends of the dependent elderly, nor have 
they reduced wealth accumulation by the elderly. 
3.2 Family games: The dependent elderly and his children 
A central aspect of LTC consists of the precise living arrangement con-
cerning the dependent elderly. Hoerger et al. (1996) develop a model 
where the family chooses a living arrangement, in such a way as to max-
imize family welfare subject to the family budget constraint. Three living 
arrangements are considered: (1) the dependent elderly lives at home; (2) 
the dependent elderly lives in a nursing home; and (3) the dependent el-
derly lives in an intergenerational household. Hoerger et al. (1996) also 
examine the effects of public subsidies on the living arrangements of the 
disabled elderly. Direct subsidies for nursing home care and state policies 
which significantly limit nursing home beds or reimbursement affect the 
choice of living arrangement. State policies which subsidize community 
living have little effect on nursing home entry, although they increase the 
probability of living independently. 
Hiedemann and Stern (1999)33 argued that, in the previous literature 
on living arrangements for the elderly, the number of children was largely 
                                                        
32 See also Sloan et al. (1997) for similar results. 
33 See more recently Hiedemann et al. (2012). 
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ignored. As a consequence, little attention was paid to strategic interac-
tions among children. In order to study those interactions among children, 
Hiedemann and Stern develop a family model with one dependent elderly 
and several children. Three living arrangements are available: (1) the 
dependent parent lives alone; (2) only one child (the primary caregiver) 
provides some care to his parent; (3) the dependent parent is sent to a 
nursing home. 
The decision process has two stages. In the first stage, each child de-
cides whether he proposes to serve as the primary caregiver. Then, in a 
second stage, the dependent parent chooses the best living arrangement 
among the available ones (i.e. children’s bid in the first stage, plus living 
alone or in a nursing home). Given that the child proposes his service as a 
primary caregiver only if there is a net positive expected utility gain from 
such a proposition, the first-stage decision obviously depends on the par-
ent’s preferences (in particular on the probability that he regards the 
child’s proposal as the best). 
Assuming, in the first stage, that only one component of the direct 
utility assigned by a particular child to a particular living arrangement is 
common knowledge, whereas the second component is a stochastic com-
ponent, Hiedemann and Stern solve the model numerically, under differ-
ent structures of preferences (e.g. free riding by children, or, alternatively, 
children with exclusivity tastes for care giving). They derive the equilib-
rium, which here consists of a vector of each child’s probability of pro-
posing his help, such that all beliefs of all children are consistent with 
each other. Hiedemann and Stern then estimate, on the basis of NLTCS 
data, the determinants of the family member’s utility. They show that 
dependent women value children’s informal help more than dependent 
men, and that the help of a caregiver of the opposite gender is, on aver-
age, more valued by the dependent parent. More importantly, Hiedemann 
and Stern show that two imperfections prevent the maximization of ag-
gregate welfare: imperfect information and coordination failures. 
Stern and Engers (2002) compare two family decision models. On the 
one hand, the unitary household model, where the entire family chooses 
the best living arrangement for the dependent elderly, that is, the living 
arrangement maximizing the family (aggregate) utility function. On the 
other hand, the voluntary model, where each family member is allowed to 
choose not to take part in the caring decisions. In that second model, the 
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chosen option is the one that maximizes the total utility of the participat-
ing family members. Stern and Engers also rely on data from the NLTCS 
to estimate and test the parameters of their models. Then, they use the 
parameter estimates to simulate the effects of the existing long-term 
trends in terms of the common but untested explanations for them. They 
also simulate the effects of alternative family bargaining rules on individ-
ual utility to measure the sensitivity of their results to the family decision-
making assumptions they adopt. 
More recently, Pezzin et al. (2007) use a two-stage bargaining model 
to analyze the living arrangement of a disabled elderly parent and the 
assistance provided to the parent by her adult children. In the first stage, 
the living arrangement of the parent is chosen (living alone, in a nursing 
home, or with a child). In the second stage, the assistance/transfers from 
the children to the elderly dependent are determined, given the living 
arrangement chosen in the first stage. 
Working by backward induction, Pezzin et al. (2007) first calculate 
the level of assistance that each child would provide to the parent in each 
possible living arrangement. Using these calculations, they then analyze 
the living arrangement that would emerge from the first-stage game. Var-
ious types of games are considered. One major result is that, since 
coresidence tends to reduce the bargaining power of coresident children 
(and, thus, to put him in a bad situation in stage 2), that living arrange-
ment, though Pareto-efficient, is unlikely to emerge from the first stage in 
the absence of explicit commitment about assistance at stage 1. That is, 
the outcome of the two-stage game need not be Pareto efficient. 
Whereas most game-theoretical family models of LTC provision have 
either focused on the children-parent relationship, or on the strategic in-
teractions among children, an important exception is Pezzin et al. (2009) 
who study whether the presence of children has any impact on the LTC 
assistance provided by a parent to his/her dependent spouse.  
3.3 Family solidarity in a dynamic world 
Finally, whereas the articles surveyed so far study the behavior of family 
members in a static context, two recent papers focus on the role of the 
family in the provision of LTC in a dynamic set up. Canta and Pestieau 
(2012) develop an overlapping generations model where each cohort of 
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adult children is divided between, on the one hand, traditional agents, 
who provide an amount of LTC help equal to what was provided by the 
previous generation and, on the other hand, opportunistic agents who 
choose LTC by maximizing their expected lifetime welfare, while antici-
pating that, if they have traditional children, providing low LTC to their 
parent will imply low LTC received once being dependent. Assuming 
exogenous transition probabilities across types, Canta and Pestieau then 
characterize the optimal LTC policy at the stationary equilibrium, and 
discuss the occurrence of crowding out of private LTC insurance in their 
results. They find two reasons for public action: redistribution and an 
informational externality. 
In another recent paper, Ponthiere (2011) examines whether state-
provided LTC can crowd out family-based LTC in an economy where 
each adult cohort is divided between altruistic and non-altruistic individu-
als, and where the transmission of the altruistic trait follows a socializa-
tion process à la Bisin and Verdier (2001). Ponthiere shows that if the 
state provides LTC to dependent parents who are not helped by their chil-
dren, parental socialization efforts aimed at transmitting altruism are nec-
essarily reduced. However, that fall in the investment in the values of 
children does not necessarily lead to a crowding out effect. The existence 
of crowding out depends on the form of the dependent’s utility function, 
on the cost and form of the socialization mechanism at work, and may 
also depend on the initial conditions (i.e. the current prevalence of family 
altruism). 
In sum, although non exhaustive, this short survey suggests that con-
siderable efforts have recently been made to open the family “black box”, 
in such a way as to represent it as a set of interdependent individuals, 
whose behavior in terms of LTC provision, dependent living arrange-
ments, or own spatial localization, is not necessarily based on pure altru-
ism but, also, on strategic considerations or social norms. 
4. Social LTC insurance  
There are very few countries with explicit LTC social insurance pro-
grams. Furthermore, these programs are not very generous: they only 
cover a small fraction of the LTC cost (typically EUR 500 a month) and 
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yet their sustainability is uncertain. Let us as an example describe the 
most developed of these schemes, the German one that was introduced in 
1995 and has been coined as the “5th pillar” to the social security sys-
tem.34 This LTC insurance covers the risk of becoming dependent on 
nursing care and attention and it is taken out with the company providing 
health insurance. If the individual is covered by state health insurance, he 
automatically has long-term care insurance. If he has private health insur-
ance and is entitled to general hospital care, he also has private long-term 
care insurance. As for health insurance, public long-term care insurance is 
financed through contributions of 1.7 percent of the gross salary split 
equally between employer and employee. Employers deduct contributions 
directly from the wages and transfer them to the health insurance funds. 
To be fair, in most countries, health care systems cover the medical 
aspects of dependence and the assistance side of social protection pro-
vides means tested LTC nursing services. The best-known example of 
that is the American Medicaid that is suspected to discourage the devel-
opment of an efficient market for LTC insurance. As we have seen above, 
there exists some work on this issue, mostly empirical. There is little 
theoretical work on the issue of LTC social insurance. 
To approach this issue, one has to consider a social planner with some 
objective function comprising equity and efficiency aspects. This planner 
typically acts as a Stackelberg leader, that is, it can commit to a policy 
and anticipates the supply and demand responses of individuals and the 
behavior of families and private insurers. In other words, both families 
and markets act as followers. If, by any chance, market forces and family 
solidarity yield a desirable outcome, our central planner does not inter-
vene. A few questions have already been addressed in this area. Jousten et 
al. (2005) focus on families with different levels of altruism. Given the 
cost of public funds, the central planner tries to induce the more altruistic 
families to assist their dependent parents and only provide aid to the de-
pendent elderly whose children are less altruistic. This may imply a 
suboptimal quality of public LTC. Pestieau and Sato (2006, 2008) study 
the problem of evenly altruistic children who differ in their earning ca-
pacities, that is in their wages and thus, in the opportunity cost of the time 
they can volunteer assisting their dependent parents. In case of parents’ 
dependency, the more productive children will tend to provide financial 
                                                        
34 The first four pillars are: health, family, unemployment and retirement. 
 The economics of long-term care: A survey 135 
help whereas the less productive children will opt for assistance in time. 
Parents with sufficiently high pensions or other resources and who do not 
expect enough assistance from their children will purchase some private 
insurance. The social welfare maximizing government can subsidize ei-
ther private assistance or private insurance; it can also directly provide 
nursing services. The final outcome is shown to depend on the loading 
cost of private insurance, the cost of public funds and the wealth of the 
parents.35  
In the remainder of this section, we present a great deal of ongoing re-
search on social insurance for LTC. But first of all we discuss some con-
ceptual issues underlying the assumptions that have to be made when 
modeling a public LTC scheme. 
4.1 Conceptual issues 
In designing an optimal public insurance scheme for LTC, one faces a 
number of conceptual hurdles. We first need to define the social welfare 
criterion that will be used in such a design. In particular, if we are con-
cerned by the wellbeing of both parents and children and if children help 
their parents in case of disability out of altruism, it must be decided 
whether or not the altruistic component of children’s utility has to be 
taken into account or simply laundered out. Laundering out filial altruism 
is often advocated to avoid double counting. If the altruistic part of the 
children’s utility were kept, the welfare of the disabled parents would be 
attributed too much weight. 
Another issue arises when the aid coming from children is not moti-
vated by altruism but by a social norm. In that case, family solidarity 
should not only be laundered out but could even be negatively weighted 
to account for the indirect cost inflicted on the aiding persons. 
One delicate ethical issue is how to treat the state of severe depend-
ence, which is a state where the dependent are unable to recognize those 
close to them or even their own reflection. This is a state where care is 
needed but not acknowledged. It might be tempting to think that the value 
of life in that state is lower than when the dependent are fully conscious. 
There is also the issue of (new) paternalism that arises in case of mis-
perception. Typically, if the individuals ignore or underestimate the risk 
                                                        
35 The assistance from children decreases if the parents’ wealth increases. 
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of disability in old age, one expects the government to induce them or 
even force them to take the appropriate protective steps. 
Finally, there is the pitfall of utilitarianism when dealing with differ-
ent preferences. Consider two individuals who live for two periods. Indi-
vidual 1 will be autonomous all his life; individual 2 is expected to be 
disabled in the second period of his life. Denoting the utility of consump-
tion by  u c  for the first period and  u d  for the second period and that 
of long-term care by  H m , the problem of the social planner is to max-
imize: 
 
       1 2 1 2 ,u c u c u d H m    (2) 
 
subject to the resource constraint: 1 2 1 2c c d m Y    , where Y repre-
sents the available resources and both the rate of interest and the time 
discount rate are 0. From the FOCs, one obtains that 1 2 1c c d c   ≷ 
2m  depending on the utility functions.  
The question of social insurance for LTC is very complex and it is 
impossible to deal with all issues at the same time. Consequently, we will 
divide it into four problems: (i) social insurance with uncertain family 
solidarity; (ii) social insurance along with private insurance; (iii) social 
assistance with strategic impoverishment; and (iv) social insurance de-
termined by majority voting. First, we present what can be viewed as a 
canonical model. 
Consider the lifetime utility of an individual facing a double uncer-
tainty: that of dependence, π, and (conditional on being dependent) that of 
getting his child’s aid, p. In the first period, the individual consumes c 
and enjoys a utility level of  u c . He devotes e units of time to boost the 
probability of altruism of his child and the rest, 1 e , to market labor at 
wage w. His earnings  1w e  finance his consumption c, saving s, and 
private insurance  . He faces a probability π of becoming dependent. 
Thus, with probability 1  , he will have a healthy second period and 
consume d, which comes from the proceeds of his saving, Rs. His utility 
is given by  u d . In case of dependence, his welfare is given by  H m  
where m denotes the amount of LTC. One expects that    u x H x , 
namely to reach the same level of utility, one needs more resources in a 
state of disability than in a state of autonomy. In case of dependence, the 
individual will receive some help from his child with probability  p e . 
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In that case, the level of care he receives is given by 
1m Rs g a      , where a is the level of help g, the social benefit 
financed by a payroll tax of rate τ, and    the compensation from 
private insurance with λ being the loading factor. The level of aid a re-
sults from an altruistic choice by the child. With probability 1 p , the 
parent does not get any aid from his child and his level of care is 
0m Rs g     . We can now write the lifetime utility of the parent: 
 




        
        
1 1 1
1 .
U u w e s u Rs
p e H Rs g a p e H Rs g
  
     
       
      
 (4) 
 
The revenue constraint implies that 
 
 1w e g   . (5) 
 
We now look at four different models. In the first model, private in-
surance is assumed away. The problem is the design of a LTC scheme 
 , g  that maximizes the lifetime utility of the individual. Heterogeneity 
of w and p is allowed. The second model focuses on the relation between 
private and public insurance. Now, family solidarity is assumed away and 
the main source of heterogeneity is w. Misperception is introduced, in 
which case the degree of misperception is another source of heterogenei-
ty. The third model deals with the problem of relatively wealthy individu-
als who could afford to finance their LTC but prefer to benefit from 
means-tested schemes to increase their bequest capacity. This is done 
through what is called a strategic impoverishment. Whereas the first three 
models are normative, the fourth is positive. Society is made of individu-
als who differ in w, p and π and we look at the existence of majority vot-
ing on g.  
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4.2 Four problems 
Public long-term care scheme with uncertain altruism 
Cremer, Gahvari and Pestieau (2012) consider a society with two over-
lapping generations. There are two periods. In the first the parents work, 
educate their children and save for retirement. In the second, parents re-
tire and incur a certain risk of dependence. Their children work and pro-
vide them with assistance in case of loss of autonomy. For various rea-
sons pertaining to migration, health and goodwill, there can here be a 
default of assistance. The probability of assistance is assumed to partially 
depend on the time that parents have earlier devoted to their children. The 
LTC insurance market is assumed away but there is a possibility of de-
veloping a social insurance program for LTC. This means that as a pro-
tection against dependence, the parents can count on both their children’s 
assistance and social benefits. They can also count on their own saving; 
that is, they can self-insure. 
The authors look at the case of a representative individual and consid-
er a three-stage game. The first stage is the choice by the government of 
social benefit and a tax to finance it. The second stage is the choice by the 
parent of education and saving. The third stage is the choice by children 
of the level of assistance the dependent parent gets. Children’s assistance 
is uncertain; it has a probability that depends on the time that parents 
devote to shaping their preferences and inculcating them with values. In 
the laissez-faire, LTC will be underprovided; its level will be insufficient 
for individuals who do not receive assistance from their children. There is 
thus room for government intervention even with (ex ante) identical indi-
viduals. The main result is a tax formula which comprises an insurance 
term and an efficiency term. The tax will depend positively on the gap 
between the marginal utility of LTC in case of non-assistance and the 
marginal utility of consumption in the first period and negatively on the 
compensated effect of the tax on the time devoted to one’s children. 
Long-term care private and public insurance 
One of the main rationales for social insurance is redistribution. Starting 
with the paper by Rochet (1991), the intuition is the following. We have 
an actuarially fair private insurance and the possibility of a social insur-
ance scheme to be developed along with an income tax. If there were no 
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tax distortion, the optimal policy is to redistribute income through income 
taxation and let individuals purchase the private insurance that fits their 
needs. If there is a tax distortion, and if the probability of loss is inversely 
correlated with earnings, then social insurance becomes desirable. Given 
that low-income individuals will benefit more from social insurance in a 
distortionless way than high-income individuals, social insurance domi-
nates income taxation. In that reasoning, moral hazard is assumed away 
but the argument remains valid with some moral hazard. 
While the above proposition applies to a number of lifecycle risks, it 
does not apply to risks where the probability is positively correlated with 
earnings. This seems to be the case for LTC.36 Dependence is known to 
increase with longevity and longevity with income. Consequently, the 
need for LTC is likely to be positively correlated with income, and Roch-
et’s argument implies that a LTC social insurance would not be desirable. 
This statement does not seem to fit reality, where we see the needs for 
LTC at the bottom of the income distribution. Where is the problem? 
First, we do not live in a world where income taxation is optimal. 
Second, even if we had an optimal tax policy, it is not clear that everyone 
would purchase LTC insurance. There is a great deal of evidence that 
most people understate the probability and the severity of far distanced 
dependence. This type of myopia or neglect calls for public action. Final-
ly, private LTC insurance is far from actuarially fair; the loading costs are 
high and lead even farsighted individuals to keep away from private in-
surance: low income individuals will rely on family solidarity or social 
assistance and high income individuals on self-insurance. 
Cremer and Pestieau (2011) study the role of social LTC insurance in 
a setting which accounts for the imperfection of income taxation and 
private insurance markets. Policy instruments include public provision of 
LTC as well as a subsidy on private insurance. The subsidy scheme may 
be linear or nonlinear. For the nonlinear part, they look at a society made 
of three types: poor, middle class and rich. The first type is too poor to 
provide for dependence; the middle class type purchases private insurance 
and the high income type is self-insured.37 
                                                        
36 Here, we have in mind disability at very old age. 
37 As shown above, this occurs when the marginal utility of LTC is lower than the marginal 
utility of consumption of healthy elderly. 
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Two crucial questions are then: (1) at what level should LTC be pro-
vided to the poor? and (2) Is it desirable to subsidize private LTC for the 
middle class? Interestingly, the results are similar under both linear and 
nonlinear schemes. 
First, in both cases, a (marginal) subsidy of private LTC insurance is 
not desirable. As a matter of fact, private insurance purchases should 
typically be taxed (at least at the margin). Second, the desirability of pub-
lic provision of LTC services depends on the way the income tax is re-
stricted. In the linear case, it may be desirable only if no demogrant (uni-
form lump-sum transfer) is available. In the nonlinear case, public provi-
sion is desirable when the income tax is sufficiently restricted. 
Specifically, this is the case when the income is only subject to a propor-
tional payroll tax while the LTC reimbursement policy can be nonlinear. 
Cremer and Roeder (2012) extend this analysis by introducing myo-
pia, and more specifically misperception of LTC risk. They show that 
social LTC provision is never second-best optimal when private insurance 
markets are fair. This is perfectly in line with Rochet’s results and due to 
the positive correlation between longevity (and, hence, LTC needs) and 
productivity. Roughly speaking, the fair private insurance does not redis-
tribute at all while the social insurance redistributes in the “wrong” direc-
tion. At the other extreme, when the loading factor in the private sector is 
sufficiently high, private coverage is completely crowded out by public 
provision. For intermediate levels of the loading factors, the solution 
relies on both types of insurance. Regarding private LTC insurance, a 
myopic agent’s tax on private LTC insurance premiums involves a 
tradeoff between paternalistic and redistributive (incentive) considera-
tions and we may have a tax as well as a subsidy on private LTC insur-
ance.  
Means tested long-term care schemes and strategic impoverishment 
Public long-term care systems in the OECD are very heterogeneous 
across and within countries. They vary in generosity, in the levels of gov-
ernment that are involved and in their universality. They are mainly pro-
vided by local authorities; they generally only cover a fraction of the 
needs and range from universal and comprehensive to means-tested sys-
tems. In this section, we focus on the means tested systems that seem to 
prevail in the majority of countries. The best known and the most studied 
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of them is the Medicaid program in the US, which covers about half of 
the LTC provision for the American elderly dependents. 
Means-testing is rarely a first choice. It is often adopted over universal 
arrangements because it allows us to devote scarce funds to those who 
need them the most. The problem is that in reality, needy people do not 
always have access to means tested programs and well to do individuals 
can benefit from them. Reasons for this paradoxical outcome can be the 
fact that the neediest often lack relevant information to take up and fear 
stigmatization to a larger extent than the members of the middle class. 
This is particularly true for means-tested public LTC. The reasons are 
varied. First, there exists a large range of strategies that lead the benefi-
ciary to impoverish himself so as to be eligible. In the US, this is called 
the Medicaid impoverishment technique.38 Second, most LTC programs 
seem to favor aid to people who are institutionalized and are unable to 
meet their financial obligations after a few years. Low-income families 
are rarely in this situation. Third, there is the practical implementation of 
means-testing for which the precise definition of “means” is not always 
clear. Does this concern the income flows or the assets of the beneficiary? 
Is there a possibility of recouping part of what has been paid by the gov-
ernment at the time of death? Can children be asked to finance their par-
ents’ LTC expenses before the government intervenes? The law is not 
clear on that. To take the example of France where there are two means 
tested programs, the PSD (Prestation Spécifique Dépendance) and the 
APA (Allocation Personnalisée d'Autonomie), the first can recuperate its 
participation on the estate of the beneficiary, whereas the second cannot. 
Finally, and above all, there is a political economy issue. One often has 
the feeling that there is a political resistance towards implementing 
means-tested programs when they concern dependent people. When the 
PSD in France or Medicaid in the US tries to get reimbursed from the 
estate of a person who has benefited from means-tested services for years, 
this makes the headlines of newspapers and is perceived as unpopular by 
the majority of public opinion. In these two countries, as in many others, 
                                                        
38 In the US, there are different strategies for giving away assets to qualify for Medicaid 
coverage. Their exists an army of attorneys who specialize in Medicaid Eligibility and/or Elder 
Law and can indicate the best way of being eligible and keeping some control of one’s assets. 
One technique is to transfer one’s assets to an irrevocable trust or to an annuity scheme. A more 
radical but also riskier approach is to proceed with inter vivos gifts to one’s children or grand-
children. 
142 Nordic Economic Policy Review, Number 2/2012 
there exist estate recovery programs that are intended to enable states to 
recoup their expenses upon a beneficiary’s death. As it appears, the rate 
of recovery is extremely low. 
Cremer and Pestieau (2012) examine part of these issues. They take a 
normative viewpoint and cope with the design of a social LTC insurance 
that would avoid giving away benefits to those who could afford to buy 
them or receive them from altruistic children. The setting is one of 
asymmetric information since we know that with perfect information (and 
absent any political constraints), a first best public LTC scheme could 
easily be designed and implemented. They analyze two approaches that 
can be combined. The first relies on a process of self-selection. If private 
resources cannot supplement the LTC benefit and if its quantity/quality is 
not very high, those with enough resources or with family support will be 
deterred from using the means tested scheme. The second relies on ex-
plicit control of intergenerational transfers. At some cost, the government 
can observe inter vivos gifts that would be made to impoverish the de-
pendent individual so as to make him eligible for public LTC and enrich 
his offspring. 
They start by looking at an economy where two types of families co-
exist. The first type, labeled altruistic, consists of a parent and a child 
who share the same welfare function. The second type, labeled selfish, 
consists of a parent and a child with no (financial) links (unlike the altru-
ists, they do not pool their resources). They assume away private insur-
ance for LTC. In a market economy, if the selfish parent is poor, he will 
be in very bad shape in case of dependence. The altruistic family is as-
sumed to be relatively well off. Whether this comes from the child or 
from the parent does not matter as they share everything. In case of de-
pendency, the altruistic parent will get a good level of LTC because of his 
own resources or because of the aid of his child. If the only objective of 
the government is to make sure that the dependent elderly gets taken care 
of, it will under perfect information only help the selfish dependent. As-
sume now that the government does not observe who is altruist and who 
is not, nor the resources of the parents. The altruistic dependent parent 
can claim that he is poor and helpless. That way, he gets the public LTC 
benefit and can either give his assets to his child or, alternatively, he does 
not have to be helped by his child. How can one avoid this unwanted 
outcome? First, one can just make sure that the overall level of LTC is 
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observable and provide an amount of social benefit that is such that the 
altruistic and wealthy dependent is deterred from mimicking the selfish 
dependent. The problem with this approach is that it can imply a level of 
public LTC that is low. An alternative or even a complementary approach 
is to control both the assets and the gifts of the altruistic dependent 
through some type of audit. The problem with this approach is that it can 
be costly. 
The political economy of long-term care 
Given the large heterogeneity in how LTC expenditures are financed 
across countries, De Donder and Pestieau (2012) study the determinants 
of the individual demand and political support for social, private and self-
insurance (i.e., saving) in an environment where people differ in income, 
risk and availability of family help. They start with a setting where only 
social and self-insurance are available, with social insurance providing a 
uniform benefit to any dependent person, financed by a proportional pay-
roll tax. The demand for social insurance is shown to decrease with in-
come (because of its redistributiveness across income levels), with family 
help and to increase with the probability of becoming dependent, when 
income, risk and family support are independent from each other. Agents 
with a large income or a very low risk prefer self-insurance (saving) to 
social insurance. Assuming a positive correlation between income and 
disability, the relationship between income and the most-preferred social 
insurance level can go both ways. The correlation between income and 
family help is not clear. With a positive correlation, richer people unam-
biguously prefer less social insurance, while the relationship between 
income and most-preferred social insurance can go both ways with a 
negative correlation. They show the existence of a majority chosen social 
insurance level, which decreases with the availability of family help in 
the economy. 
Then, they introduce an actuarially fair private insurance into the pic-
ture. The main result is that if agents only differ in income, the introduc-
tion of private insurance does not affect its majority chosen level. The 
intuition is that private insurance induces all above-average-income 
agents to switch their support in favor of private (rather than social) in-
surance, but does not affect the preferences of below-average-income 
agents. With a loading factor, the demand for private insurance decreases 
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both at the extensive and the intensive margin, up to the point where it 
becomes nil and where rich agents prefer to exclusively self-insure.39 
5. Conclusions 
There is a strong feeling that the era of LTC has arrived and represents a 
crucial challenge for the decades to come. Right now, the provision of 
LTC is not adequate and the future appears to be gloomy. The source of 
the problem is twofold, demographic and societal. On the one hand, one 
witnesses a rapid increase of people aged 80+. The issue of dependency 
arises precisely in that age bracket. On the other hand, with the drastic 
change in family values, the increasing number of childless households, 
the mobility of children and the increasing rate of labor market activity of 
women, particularly those aged 50-65, the number of dependent elderly 
who cannot count on the assistance of anyone is likely to increase. Those 
two parallel evolutions explain why there is a mounting demand on the 
government and on the market to provide alternatives to the family. But it 
is not clear that the reasons that explain why the role of the state and the 
market has been so small up to now will suddenly disappear. 
In this paper, we have discussed the nature of these causes and the ex-
tent to which we can expect them to fade away. The solution of LTC has 
to be found in an integrated view of the role of the market, the state and 
the family. One needs public authorities that are ready to adopt policies 
that welcome and even foster the intervention of both the market and the 
family. Solutions exist but they will not bring us to the first best optimum. 
There are indeed problems that cannot be solved even with the best will. 
The fact that individuals act opportunistically and that they will then hide 
both characteristics and actions that can be used by private insurers and 
the government cannot be avoided. This being said, the tracks of reform 
are known. First of all, like for the annuity market, much can be done to 
thicken the LTC insurance market. The government can certainly help but 
the industry itself has its own responsibility and should in the future ex-
hibit more imagination by offering insurance packages that better fit the 
                                                        
39 See also Nuscheler and Roeder (2010) who study how the heterogeneity in individual in-
come and risk affects the preferences for redistributive income taxation versus public financing 
of LTC. 
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needs of individuals. Regarding family solidarity, there are measures (part 
time, tax deduction) that can be taken to facilitate combining work and 
assistance. It is important to remember that family solidarity is crucial but 
should rest as much as possible on chosen rather than on forced altruism. 
Finally, the government can intervene not only indirectly by fostering 
private insurance and family assistance but directly by providing all sorts 
of services including social insurance. Above all, a real political will is 
needed. Even though we are all threatened by dependency, LTC remains 
an unattractive political issue. We hope that this will soon change. 
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